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ABSTRACT 
 
Religious  people  may  feel  confident  that  they  have  something  that  non-
religious people lack, namely, direct experience of God. They may claim that 
such  religious  experience,  like  visions  of  God,  is  a  way  of  knowing  God’s 
existence. This claim has been examined by some scholars and philosophers in 
the field of philosophy of religion. The purpose of this writing is to analyze the 
reasonableness of believing in the existence of God on the basis of this claim. 
The methodological approach of gathering data is mainly through document 
analysis on various books of philosophy of religion and philosophy of God. This 
writing concludes that visions lack the consistency and predictability needed to 
form the basis of any factual belief. 
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The  first  part  of  this  writing  span  in  general  terms  of  what  may  be  called  the  direct 
experience; vision  of  God.  It  takes  into accounts the  religious  experiences  that  seem  to 
indicate the feeling of the moment and then distinguishes between this direct perceiving of 
God and other kind of conscious experiences. The examples quoted in this part have been 
taken from various religions, mainly Christianity and Hinduism. Thereafter, in the second 
part of the writing, it tries to show how visions of God fail to provide evidence for religious 
claims. There will be four main reasons in arguing that this concept does not seem to be 
available to support any claim for the existence of God. The discussion will go on further to 
discuss the arguments that seem to give a cognitive status to the mystical experiences of 
God. However, the essay will finally conclude the discussion with the suggestion that the 
concept of vision of God lacks the consistency and predictability needed to form the basis of 
any factual belief at all. 
 
The Concept of Vision of God 
 
Religious experience is an umbrella term covering many different types of experience – 
charismatic  phenomena,  numinous  feeling,  possession,  conversion  experience,  mystical 
consciousness, visions, voices and so on. It is important here to look at the terminology 
involved in this discussion. The word vision means a mental picture of a possible situation 
or state of affairs, in which we imagine how things might be different from the way they are 
now. It is also a mental picture which you have as a result of divine inspiration, madness, or 
taking drugs (Cobuild 1989: 1627). In line with the above meaning, vision is one of the five 
main sensations – sight, hear, smell, taste and touch. All these kind of physical sensations, 
along with the intellectual processing (reasoning), are the fundamental characteristics or 
elements of the cognitive aspects of our ordinary consciousness. Vision, however, in this 
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context does not merely involve empirical objects which can be perceived by our sensory – 
intellectual  consciousness,  but  inclusive  of  the  objects  of  supra-sensory.  Actually,  these 
kinds of objects are those divine being which could not be seen by our eyes as they are non-
physical. Because of the characteristic and they are seldom occur in our life, this kind of 
vision is totally different from that we normally experience.  
Let  us  first  consider  the  claims  that  the  theologians  have  made.  Some  of  their 
experiences are usually described as follows: “I have direct experience of God”, “I saw a vision 
of Archangel Gabriel”, “I seem to see the Blessed Virgin Mary”, and ‘I saw Christ at my side”. 
These assertions are found among Christians and we will discuss later the visions of other 
religions. We should compare these assertions with the statement of seeing worldly objects, 
such as: “I saw a black horse”, “I seem to see a red tomato”, and “I see a car in front of the 
house”. Firstly, we will start by examining the last three examples of the physical objects 
perceived by our ordinary visions. We can touch the black horse, taste the tomato and listen 
to the car engine. We can examine these objects with certainty by other physical sensations. 
On the  whole,  our  sense experiences typically involve the conviction  that the object on 
which  the  experience  is  focused  and  ‘is  really  there’,  that  it  exists  and  that  one 
‘experimentally’  apprehends  it.  This  conviction  is  not  an  interpretation  which  is placed 
upon the experience, but a part of the experience itself. 
Obviously,  as  mentioned  above,  vision  or  perception  requires  a  real  object. 
Perception could be analyzed into a conscious experience (CE) of a perceiver (P), the object 
(O)  perceived,  and  a relation  (R)  between  the object  and  the  perception.  R  is  a causal 
relation. O causes CE or is an indispensable part of the cause (Matson 1965: 12-13). If the 
perceiver is prevented from perceiving any objects, for examples, the eyes are closed, or he 
is a blind man, no relations occur, and he perceives nothing, even if there happens to be an 
object in front  of him. We can  say  that his  claim  of experiencing  the objects is only an 
imagination or hallucination. The case is different when we look at the vision of God, of the 
Virgin Mary, and of the Archangel Gabriel. The Christians believe that God is sometimes 
present and shows Himself to the believer, in one of the various ways He chooses to. But we 
are so made that what we apprehend of the object is the sort of thing that could not be 
photographed,  touched,  smelled  or  seen  by  others.  It  is  a  special  sort  of  things  that  is 
beyond all things and beyond our sensory-intellectual consciousness. It is by no means clear 
that the relation between sense experiences and physical objects are significantly different 
from the relations between mystical experiences and an object like God. 
The way in which many theologians talk about their experiences seem to show that 
they think of knowing God as something requiring a kind of the sixth sense. The sixth sense 
is very different from the above five. For the Divine Being whom they claim to have seen, 
only exists, in the perceivers’ experiences alone, and could not be justified by others (Martin 
1973: 338). Returning for a moment to the case of sense experience, there is a checking 
procedure in ‘seeing’ the physical objects but not for the religious ‘seeing’. The result of the 
checking procedure is always supportive of our claims and is confirmed by other people. 
But if, while checking over our proof, we find that they are unsuitable at all to the object 
perceived, for example, the horse is not black; we only say that, “I didn’t really see, I only 
thought I did”. We have so far encountered few differences between the ordinary vision and 
the vision of Divine Being. That religious vision has no causal efficacy, no relation between 
the subject and the object, vision is self certifying and no effective way could be used as a 
procedure in checking the vision. All these difficulties showed that this kind of experience 
does not involve the conviction that the object really exists and we really saw it. But, how 
can we prove the existence of the phenomenon that has happened and finished in the past; 
an experience which is not continual but a ‘one-off’ experience?  The Incompatibility of the Vision of God 
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In  describing  the  content  of  our  experiences,  there  occurs  another  problem  of 
language. How could we describe the ineffable with a finite term? Surely, such language is 
inadequate. This leads the theologians to use metaphors. By using metaphors we emphasize 
the fact that often we come to understand the point of an argument or problem in logic 
suddenly. This then points to another difference between sense experience and mystical 
experience,  where  the  conviction  of  the  ontological  interpretation  is  placed  upon  the 
experience, and not part of the experience itself.  
All those difficulties are the major reasons why we should not say that visionary 
experience has cognitive value. As far as we see, all what we mean when we say that an 
experience  is cognitive or perceptual, is  that through this experience we  come to know 
something which could not know, or could not know as easily, in other ways, and probably 
that the knowledge in question is non-inferential. In short, because the vision is naturally 
weak, we cannot base any factual belief on it and cannot rely on vision as a form of evidence 
of faith. We shall later deal with these factors in detail in the next part of the essay.  
Now we come to the classical classification of vision made by the contemplative 
Catholic theologians. They distinguished three classes of vision; the external, the imaginary 
or the imaginably, and the intellectual. An external vision is one in which what appears, 
appears as part of the environment and may be confused with the ordinary world of things 
and people. An imaginary vision is one in which what appears, appears as an object of vision 
in some sense, but can be distinguished sharply from material objects. An intellectual vision 
is not a vision at all but a feeling of presence (Mac Intyre 1969: 254). Alasdair Mac Intyre, in 
his writing  about Visions,  reduced  these  three classifications  to  two classes. First,  those 
visions  which can  properly  be  called such,  that  is,  those where  something  is seen;  and 
second, those where the experience is of a feeling-state or of a mental image, which are only 
called visions by a honorific extension of the term (Mac Intyre 1969: 255). An example may 
help us to understand the visions in discussion. It is clear that phenomenologically different 
visions have  different  contents.  Much the  greater  part  of the phenomenology of visions 
comes unmistakably from the very own scriptures and tradition of those experienced. St. 
Teresa of Avila, one of the classic contemplatives, was reported to value the intellectual 
visions the most highly and external visions at the least. She wrote: 
 
I had the following experience. I was at prayer on a festival of the glorious 
Saint Peter when I saw Christ at my side – or to put it better, I was conscious of 
Him, for neither with the eyes of the body nor with those of the soul did I see 
anything. I thought He was quite close to me and I saw that it was He who, as I 
thought, was speaking to me ... All the time Jesus Christ seemed to be beside 
me, but, as this was not an imaginary vision. I could not discern in what form: 
what I felt very clearly was that all the time He was at my right hand, and a 
witness of everything that I was doing, and that, whenever I became slightly 
recollected  or  was  not  greatly  distracted,  I  could  not  but  be  aware of  His 
nearness to me (Peers 1957: 170). 
 
It was well-known in the Bible, that the Prophet Isaiah saw a vision of Yahweh in the 
Temple. He explains: “Woe to me!” I cried. “I am ruined! For I am a man of unclean lips, and I 
live  among a people  of unclean  lips, and my  eyes have seen the King, the  Lord Almighty” 
(Isaiah 6: 5). In Hinduism, Sri Rama Krishna experienced the vision of the Goddess Kali. 
Buddhists sometimes seek visions of celestial Buddha and Bodhisattvas (Bassuk 1987: 5). 
Early Jewish mystics cultivated visions of God’s throne-chariot. Some people report spiritual International Journal of Islamic Thought 
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experiences where they claim to have visions of God. Common reported experiences also 
include seeing light or a magnificent being seated on a throne. 
In Islamic doctrine, God cannot be seen in this life but the believers will see God in 
the next life; even then, God will not be grasped in totally. This is stated clearly in the Quran: 
“On that day some faces will be bright, looking at their Lord” (Quran 75: 22-23). Rendering 
images of God in Islam in this life is impossibility and an amount to disbelief, as God tells in 
the Quran that nothing resembles Him (Quran 42: 11, 112: 4). The human mind is a true 
marvel but in certain areas it is limited. God is different from anything the human mind can 
think of or imagine, so the mind will become confused if it tries to picture God.  Eyes cannot 
bear the vision of God. God tells in the Quran: “Vision cannot grasp Him, but His Grasp is over 
all vision” (Quran 6:103). Moses, to whom God spoke and gave great miracles, was chosen 
by God to be His Prophet. It is said that he thought that, since God used to speak to him, he 
might be able to actually see God. The story in the Quran tells us about the request of Moses 
to see God: 
 
And when Moses arrived at our appointed time and his Lord spoke to him, he 
said, ‘My Lord, show me (Yourself) that I may look at You’. (God) said, ‘you will 
not see Me, but look at the mountain; if it should remain in place, then you will 
see Me.’ But when His Lord appeared to the mountain, He rendered it level, and 
Moses fell unconscious. And when He awoke, he said, ‘Exalted are You! I have 
repented to You, and I am the first of the believers’ (Quran 7: 143). 
 
God made it clear that no-one, including the great prophet Moses, can bear the sight of 
the divine, for God is too great to be grasped by human eyes in this life. According to the 
Quran, Moses realized his request was in error; therefore, he sought forgiveness from God 
for  having  asked.  Did  Prophet  Mohammed  see  God  in  this  life?  Prophet  Mohammed 
travelled in a miraculous journey through the heavens and met God.  People thought that 
since Prophet Mohammed spoke to God in that journey, he probably saw God too. One of the 
companions, Abu Dahr, asked about it.  The Prophet replied: “There was only light, how 
could I see Him?” (Sahih Muslim). To the question what was the light he saw, the Prophet 
explained: “Surely, God does not sleep nor it is befitting for Him to sleep. He is the one who 
lowers the scales and raises them. The deeds of the night go up to Him before the deeds of the 
day and those of the day before those of the night, and His veil is light” (Sahih Muslim).  
As far as I am concerned, neither the scripture nor the traditions are found to have 
reported about Prophet Mohammed experienced a vision of God in His pure Essence. What 
we only know is about his auditory experience of Gabriel, who recites passages of what has 
to become the Quran (Quran 2: 97). There were also many claims from the Sufis or Islamic 
mystics of having a very personal experience of God, such as al-Hallaj and Ibn al-Arabi. 
Many Sufi masters felt that it was inappropriate to share their mystical experience with the 
masses, yet al-Hallaj openly did so in his writings and through his teachings. He falls into 
trances which he attributed ‘to being in the presence of God’. During one of these trances, he 
would utter: ﻖﺤﻟا ﺎﻧأ  ; “I am The Truth”, which was taken to mean that he was claiming to be 
God, since “The Truth” is one of the Ninety Nine Names of Allah. In another controversial 
statement, al-Hallaj claimed “There is nothing wrapped in my turban but God,” and similarly 
he would point to his cloak and say, ﷲ ﻻإ ﻲﺘﺒﺟ ﻲﻓ ﺎﻣ; “There is nothing in my cloak but God” 
(Mason 1995). The above explanation is to suggest that the same experience of vision is 
being differently interpreted and described according to the beliefs of those experienced, 
traditions and cultures. The specific material out of which the vision is composed – the The Incompatibility of the Vision of God 
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figure of an angel, or Christ, or Krishna, or Kali, or of a throne, a heart, a cloud, is supplied by 
the imagination and memory of the mystics. 
There  are  indeed  certain  features  of  visionary  experiences  that  appear  cross-
culturally; the direct awareness of light and the relational awareness of height, depth and 
magnitude.  These  seem  to  have  universal  symbolic  significance.  However  even  the 
experience, for example, of seeing a bright light can take on a tradition-specific character. 
Thus, in many of the reports the ‘being of light’ is experienced by Christians, but not by 
people of other traditions, as the dazzling presence of Christ (Hick 1989: 166). We have 
seen in so far that vision as well as voices which are usually experienced at the time of 
seeing a vision of the God, is the peak experience of the mystics of different religions. This is 
to say that the sort of persons who are mystics may often be the sort of persons who see 
visions and hear voices. However, for many of the mystics these unusual experiences were 
unexpected.  They are deeply concerned in prayers and devotions to their God. By the time 
their soul recognizes the presence of God, the recognition caused by the effect which God 
produces in their soul, the soul distinctively sees that God is present. They never aim nor 
dream to have all those experiences. A case in point is St. Teresa of Avila (Peers 1957: 171). 
No one can deny the existence of feelings and experiences which the mystics call visions.  
Indeed  almost  everyone will agree  that  what  the  mystics experienced in  their  lives  are 
unmistakably to be called mystical experiences. And indeed, who are we to say that the 
visions (and voices) are not mystical phenomena? The exclusion of visions (and voices) 
from the class of mystical experience is because both are sensuous experiences. A vision is a 
piece of visual imagery having colour and shape, and a voice is an auditory image. While a 
genuine  mystical  experience  is  non-sensuous  and  it  is  formless,  shapeless,  colourless, 
odourless,  and  soundless.  Nevertheless,  the  exclusion  of  vision  and  (voices)  from  the 
category of mystical experiences does not entail its exclusion from the sphere of religious 
experiences.  
 
Arguments against the Visions of God 
 
We have already seen so far that naturally, vision is too weak to provide any evidence for 
religious belief. We believed in what our eyes have seen and we can make sure other people 
believe  in the existence of the object, for they normally exist in  this world and nothing 
would  intervene  in  meantime  the relation between our  perceptions and  the  objects.  In 
contrast to this, are things or objects which we only believe to exist, because they are non-
physical and non-sensuous? The experience of seeing a vision (and hearing voices) is not 
wholly accepted by others and could not lead them to form the belief of its existence, on the 
basis of the reported experience alone. This type of vision involves many complications. 
How do we know that someone has had direct experience of God or that we ourselves had 
such an experience? The problem involves verification or falsification of the claims. This will 
entail another question. If the object perceived is God, is He really present at the time an 
individual saw Him? Or to put it more clearly, does God’s existence require any form or is it 
formless?  Can  the  experience  of  God  be  described  or  analyzed  in  terms  of  any  of  the 
elements  of  sensory-intellectual  consciousness?  And  the  last  question  is:  how  does  the 
believer know that the vision is really from God and has not been sent to him by devil? 
These questions are weighty and the answer must concede much to them. We shall deal 
with all of these problems along with our discussion of this part. 
Now we can begin to consider the reasons why the visions of the Infinite Being 
could not support any claims of its existence and could not form any factual belief at all. It is 
worth  nothing  that,  some  of  the  religious  thinkers  have  argued  that  the  religious International Journal of Islamic Thought 
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experiences cannot be cognitive because they provide support for logically incompatible 
claims.  And,  our  argument  is  that,  if  religious  experience  were  unable  to  provide  any 
evidence for religious claims, vision would do so. To support this statement, or even to 
explain it fairly fully, would involve many arguments by religious thinkers. The study finds 
that there are four reasons or difficulties in constructing religious belief upon visions. These 
are, firstly because visions are not public but private experiences, secondly because visions 
conflict with themselves, thirdly because we do not experience the connection between the 
visions and their supposed objects, and fourthly because there are no criteria for sorting out 
veridical visions from those which are not veridical. 
We begin with the first reason, that visions have no evidential value because they 
are  not  public.  Of  course  it  would  be  rational  for  everybody  to  believe  in  his  own 
experiences and in his own perception. But, this is not to say that it is also rational for 
others to believe in another person’s claim on the basis of his perception. Our claims of such 
perceptions, however reasonableness they may seem to us, should first be examined by 
others. The evidential value of any claims of the existence of something perceived in the 
vision would be greatly increased if it has been based upon the rational corroboration of 
others.  For  the  ordinary  test  in  distinguishing  genuine  from  fantasies,  depends  on  the 
publicity of the phenomena. In the real-life realm, we can often specify the kind of sense-
organs, training, mental set, and the external conditions which will (almost) ensure that if a 
percept is there, the subject will perceive it. The absence of perceptual experience with the 
presence of all the enabling conditions implies that the object probably was not present. 
Someone may claim to see crumbs on white tablecloth, but other people with good eyesight, 
who  know  what  crumbs  look  like,  who  are  honest,  and  who  are  told  to  examine  the 
tablecloth, say there are no crumbs, and then the original claim becomes improbable. 
Let us assume the case of religious experience. Someone is known to have perceived 
some persons, and the perceiver claims, on the basis of this experience, to have knowledge 
of existence of a God. What is needed is that several persons, of normal eyesight, hearing, 
and intelligence, not predisposed to believe the report of the phenomenon, and so insulated 
from one another that the effects of suggestibility can be ruled out, should corroborate the 
apparition.  The claimant  (the  mystic)  should regard  the  agreement  of others who  have 
similar  experiences  as  confirming  his  claims  or  the  veridical  character  of  his  own 
experience. It is possible that if others were to fail altogether to have similar experience, he 
would take this fact as counting against the cognitive value of his experience. And, in the 
absence of confirmation from fellow men, the hypothesis that the appearance is delusory 
must have greater probability than that is veridical. We meet then with the second point, 
that  visions  have  conflicts  in  themselves,  or  they  tend  to  formulate  themselves  into 
contradictory statements simultaneously. The point of every human’s experience is that it 
provides a basic for making claims about something other than the experience, of itself. As 
an example, if we had information about the existence of a deer behind a bush, but when we 
saw it, it was running away after hearing the noise of our footsteps in the jungle. Although 
we never know of its existence in the beginning, at that moment, our experience provided 
us with evidence for the existential claims of something other than itself. 
But how do all of these apply to the experience of a distinctly 'mental' kind, a feeling 
state  of  an  image?  It  seems  to  be  that  the  experience  cannot,  of  itself,  yield  to  us  any 
information about anything, other than the experience. We could never know from such 
experience of vision that they had the character of messages from the divine being, unless, 
we already possessed a prior knowledge of, and of the way in which, the messages from  
Divine Being were to be identified. If this is the case, we meet a problem where we must 
agree  that  the  evidence  for  the  divine  existence  is  anterior  to  our  experience,  and, The Incompatibility of the Vision of God 
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moreover, it is not derived from it (Matson 1965: 17). Secondly, we meet with a few other 
difficulties in the language that the mystics use to express their immediate experience of 
God. All words in all languages are the products of our sensory-intellectual consciousness 
and express or describe its elements or some combination of them. But as these elements 
are not found in this kind of experience, it is felt to be impossible to describe it in any words 
whatever.  In  spite  of  the  incommensurability  of  this  experience,  the  mystics  or  the 
theologians do describe their experience in roundabout ways, at the same time telling us 
that the words they use are inadequate. This raises a serious problem, for ‘how do we use 
the inappropriate terms to express the inexpressible’, and ‘to describe the indescribable’? 
And, there  may be cases also in  which the claimant  uses highly technical and  probably 
misunderstood  terminology  to  describe  his  experience.    How  could  we  trust  the 
descriptions of a person who claimed to have ‘vision’, but we have a reason to prove that he 
misunderstood and did not understand the terms he uses in his descriptions? Surely, his 
descriptions cannot be taken as an accurate description of the way the things appeared to 
him.  And, surely, it is rational for others to say that we should not rely on the statements 
reported by the claimant to form the belief of the existence of something, namely, God. 
We move to discern the same difficulty from the question of the meaning of the 
religious expression. We are not only dissatisfied with the terms used by the experiencing 
person in their assertions, we are also doubtful about the meaning of those expressions. If 
the believer defined his assertions with language which he could understand by referring to 
his past experiences, we could compare the similarity of his utterances, with that which is 
uses in traditional arguments. For instance we can ask what there is in common between 
the words God, the angel and so on which he uses them and the words God and the angel as 
they are used. If the meaning of the words is used in accordance with the religious context, 
we could approach the same doubt by asking how does the believer claim to know that the 
being that present to him was the God, the Uncreated, the Imperishable beyond? Both of 
these questions are difficult to be answered. 
The  same  point  can  be  brought  out  by  considering  another  difficulty  that  the 
inexorable demand of religiously adequate language seems to make of experience of God, a 
notion  that  is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  It  is  often  assumed  that  our  God,  is  infinite, 
insensible, imperishable, and has many other characterizations. All that we mean when we 
use these characterizations is to show that the concept of not being finite, and so on, lies 
beyond  the  range  of  all  our  positive  substantial  characterizations.  We  are  unable  to 
comprehend the divine substance by knowing what it is? But we are able to have some 
knowledge of it by knowing what it is not? The definition of God as Infinite is intended to 
distinguish  between  God  and  everything  finite,  as  well  as  to  distinguish  God  from 
everything that is perishable. But, if God is Infinite, Insensible, and Imperishable, how can 
he be manifested in any, surely, the distinctive definitions between God and others will 
involve  contradictions,  for  we  have  to  remove  those  meanings  from  the  world  of  our 
experiences (Mac Intyre 1969: 256). 
Let us next consider the third reason why we feel fairly certain that visions are too 
weak to support any existential claims. We have defined the meaning of perception, that it 
consist of a subject, an object and a connection between both of them, which is the vital part 
of every perception in distinguishing between a true perception and an imagination. Our 
sense  perception  of  the  physical  objects  is  always  veridical,  or  it  might  be  under 
circumstances delusive, if some reason could have been shown. Or again, very commonly, 
we do logically infer the unseen physical object or the no longer seen from the object that 
we now see. We infer the approaching of a ship from the smoke coming from the funnel, so 
also we infer the fire from the smoke. We can successfully deduce the invisible from the International Journal of Islamic Thought 
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visible object only if we have grounds for believing in a correlation between the occurrence 
of the sign (the seen) and the thing signified (the unseen). However, we are not at all being 
sure  that  we  can  apply  the  same  rule  to  the  claim  of  the  existence  of  God  from  the 
apparitions.  Because  we  well  understand  that  the  logical  relations  between  sense 
experiences and physical objects are different from the logical relation between mystical 
experiences and divine object. In order to infer the existence of the divine being from an 
apparition,  we  should  have  an  experience  of  the  connection  between  vision  and  its 
supposed objects. But all that we experience is only the vision. We always feel uncertain 
with visionary experience, unless we can prove the genuineness of an experience of that 
object, and the reality of the object. Therefore, we have a ground for believing their relation.  
But all of these will not do. Before we move on to the final reason, a word should be said 
about the nature of visions. C. B. Martin and others have asserted that there are no tests and 
check-up  procedures  which  the  mystics  and  others  should  regard  as  relevant  to  a 
determination  of  the  truth  or  falsify  the  claims  they  make.  The  visionary  experiences 
therefore, could not be determined with certainty, and their claims are private, not public 
(as has been shown earlier in the first argument), and self-authenticating. 
Finally, we deal with the fourth challenge to the concept of visions. We should never 
base any ontological claims on vision, for we could never find any concrete rules or criteria 
in identifying the veridical experiences from those which are not (Mac Intyre 1969: 257). In 
the case of sense experience, we find it is hard to make any assurance of what the object 
being reported looks like. As an example, someone who appeared again after an absence of 
five years would have to be very much changed before we had real doubts as to his identity, 
but after two or three thousand years it is acre hard to gain credence of his identity. In the 
religious sphere, however, the case is worse. Suppose that someone sees a vision of Virgin 
Mary. What he sees has a shape, the shape of a women, and colour, white skin, blue raiment, 
a golden halo, and so on. And, another man perhaps claims to have seen her in such a place 
like a Roman Catholic  Church. We  should  at first, consider many questions about  these 
claims, as in the first case of sense experience, before we base or confirm belief in it. We can 
ask such of the questions like how did the claimant know that it was the Virgin Mary who 
appeared to him? Can he really be sure that the identification of her is adequate? If it is not, 
what further identification could there be? And, if it is enough, we could doubt again the 
resemblances of these identifications with those described in the Bible. What makes him 
believe that the delivered messages in the vision are the messages from God rather than the 
wiles of the devil? What criteria does the believer invoke to distinguish true visions from 
false? And, how do we specify the criteria of personal identity? What are the standard tests 
that should be used In identifying the objects of the mystical experiences, and could the test 
be used in examining the mutual experience of vision in other religions of the world? In fact, 
however good one is trying to answer all the queries, it would never be possible to gain a 
satisfactory explanation or answer. For no one has authentic evidence of the identification 
of the appeared object. No appropriate criteria could be applied to them. The only criterion 
possible is presumably the congruence of the messages accepted in the visions with such 
theological doctrines as are already believed. If this is admitted, it might be argued that 
visions could only afford confirmation of belief but could never be the original ground of it. 
The whole grounds of this discussion points to the conclusion that it is irrational for people 
to base their belief of the existence of divine being on the basis of visionary experience 
because it has no evidential value in confirming any belief. The valid ground of religious 
belief must be found somewhere other than vision, and, if visions are valid for any evidence, 
it should be remembered that it is for something else rather than for a belief.  
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Some Considerations 
 
We have seen so far that some religious thinkers have shown the non-cognitive status of 
religious experience, as well as, the visionary experiences of God. It is worthwhile for us to 
have a brief look into some of the answers from many others against those challenges. Such 
as answer is rational and valuable, but, nevertheless, we still cannot be happy to say that 
visions could stand as an independent evidence for our faith. There are several substantial 
objections that have been brought out by authors of religious philosophers, such as Richard 
Swinburne, in his book The Existence of God. This philosopher produced two principles - The 
Principle of Credulity, and the Principle of Testimony - designed to show that immediate 
religious  experience  could  reach  a  justified  conclusion  about  the  existence  of  God 
(Swinburne 1979: 254-276). ‘Being well concerned with Swinburne's arguments Caroline 
Frank Davis in her book The Evidential Force of Religious Experience, tries to show that 
various  types  of  challenges  to  the  religious  experiences  ended  unsuccessfully  in  many 
aspects, and she comes to the conclusion that a quasi-sensory religious experience, namely, 
a vision, has evidential force by applying her good reason which she called ‘A Cumulative 
Argument’. We shall look first at some of her arguments which might add a great force to 
the main reasons we have argued. First of all is the argument against the challenges of the 
non-publicity characteristic of visions, that other people who would have been expected to 
perceive the alleged percept if it were there, did not have the experience of its seeming to 
them that the object was there. She argued that in our real-life, we cannot always be sure 
that the observers fulfilled all the necessary conditions, or, often, just what those necessary 
conditions are. In the religious case, the situation is even less clear-cut. The fact that people 
equally attentive and equally well equipped with sense-organs and concepts do not have the 
same experiences does not count against the veridical of a religious experience. For, if there 
is a God, one would expect Him to be able to choose to whom He reveals Himself. Thus, one 
person may have such an experience while his neighbour may not (Davis 1989: 137 & 241). 
This argument, in my view, is a very powerful challenge to our first reason. We feel 
fully certain that not all external percept are public in the sense that anyone fulfilling certain 
physical and perceptual conditions will have an experience of its seeming to them that the 
percept is there, because it is God's freewill to behave and to choose to whom He should 
reveal Himself. So also we understand that many hidden factors such as faith may be at 
work. And, because of these aspects - the unexpected and the immeasurability of religious 
experience - we should stress again, that we could not base any existential claims on vision. 
Her argument, therefore, is an empty tautology. Turning now to the charge that there are no 
tests  and  checking  procedures  in  evaluating  mystical  experiences  as  we  usually  use  in 
examining sense experiences. William J. Wainwright argued that there are two independent 
kinds  to  tests  -  tests which are  used  to  determine  the reality  of  the  object  of  mystical 
experiences, and tests which are used to determine the genuineness of an experience of that 
object. In determining the truth of the claim that God is real, one would address oneself to 
considerations of logic, review the more telling points made by theists and atheists, and so 
on. The other set of tests containing six criteria, are used to determine the genuineness of an 
experience  of  the  object.  These  objections  strike  on  the  fourth  sort  of  challenges  with 
greater force. Each of the following six criteria is employed in the Christian community, as 
well as in other communities. 
First, the consequences of a veridical experience must be good, fruitful and editing 
for the mystic. "By their fruit ye shall know them” (Matthew 7:0). The good effect which the 
experience has on others also should be considered. These first two tests are moral tests. 
The third test is that one would not expect a vision of God to lead to insignificant or silly International Journal of Islamic Thought 
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talk. The fourth is that we must examine what the mystic says on the basis of his experience 
whether it agrees or disagrees with orthodox talk. The fifth and sixth tests depend upon the 
truth of doctrines concerning the holiness and authoritative character of the individual of 
community in question (Wainwright 1973: 372). Having looked at these new criteria, it is 
not wrong to say that they are similar to the tests which take things into account like the 
position of the observer and the condition of his sensory equipment, i.e. the tests which we 
employ in ordinary perceptual cases. To this end, we can ask whether we could use similar 
methods to examine the different nature of things. Rationally, the desired result might not 
be  fully  satisfied,  since  it  will  bring  the  unique  and  the  not  apprehensible  mystical 
experience to a lower condition, similar to sensual experiences. Furthermore, we should ask 
whether these criteria are adequate enough to examine the effect of the experience. If we 
have  to  depend  only  on  these criteria, do  they  bring us  to a  confirmation  belief of  the 
existence of the cause of the experience; the divine being?  It is quite clear that those criteria 
should not bear the demand of these questions. Although there are many religious thinkers 
who try to give victory to the status of religious experience such as those that have been 
made by Swinburne, Wainwright, and Caroline Frank Davis, the fact that visions have no 
evidential value still cannot be denied. As we have shown above, some of their arguments 
are  unsuccessful  in  providing  any  existing  claims.  Some  of  their  arguments  are  only 
successful in very limited cases. 
To summarize, I shall say that I am on the same side with those who claim that 
visions have no cognitive value. To show what I mean, let us have a look at a few more 
reasons which will bring us with fuller certainty to what we have argued for so long. We can 
challenge the claim that he has a very unreliable memory, especially regarding his own 
experience.  This  is  because;  under  certain  circumstances  people  generally  have  an 
inaccurate recall of their own experience. And, we also know that experiences which are 
very  brief,  not  repeated,  unfamiliar,  and  not  easily  modified,  tend  to  be  difficult  to 
remember and to report. Religious experiences are often of that sort. To make any existing 
claims on religious experience, as well as vision, therefore, would be meaningless. Theists 
agree that genuine religious experiences may occur spontaneously to theologically naive 
and even irreligious subjects. And, it is a common religious belief that subjects of religious 
experiences can  acquire  knowledge  ‘directly’,  without  having  to  go  through  the  normal 
channels of experience, authority, or conscious inference. In such situations, who can say 
that a particular subject has not had the right type of prior experience to be able to make 
religious claims? Another reason is that religious experiences seem to support incompatible 
claims.  Some  mystics  claim  to  perceive  the  God of  Christianity.  Others  think  they  taste 
Nirvana.  While  others  believe  they  experience  the  impersonal  Brahman.  Obviously,  the 
claims  were  not  on  the  same  one  because  they  were  based  on  interpretations  of 
experiences. Surely,  these  claims, then, provide a  reason  for discounting  their visionary 
experiences. In evaluating sensual experience, we consider predictions which have been 
based upon that experience. Successful predictions count for its veridical and unsuccessful 
predictions  count  against  it.  A  few  predictions  do  appear  to  be  based  upon  mystical 
experience,  such as  that the soul is immortal, and the claim that  human beings  will be 
resurrected. Both claims are verifiable. However, the experiences which would justify them 
are post-Advent experiences. Neither mystics nor non-mystics can verify these claims in this 
life.  Since  these  predictions  cannot be  checked,  they  cannot  be  appealed  to  in  order  to 
establish the cognitive value of a particular instance of mystical experience. On the whole, 
then, it is reasonable to say that visions lack the consistency and predictability needed to 
form the basis of any factual belief. The ground of belief then is to be found elsewhere, that 
is in the revelatory events that are already believed. The Incompatibility of the Vision of God 
Indriaty Ismail 
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